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EVE AND THE FORBIDDEN FRUIT: 
REFLECTIONS ON A FEMINIST METHODOLOGY 
COLLEEN M. OLESENt 
When a particular way of seeing is analyzed, what was ac-
cepted as natural is made strange. Part of that strangeness 
is the realisation that beneath the accepted order of life 
lie hidden power relations. 1 
In traditional Western legal analysis, the standard approach to dis-
pute resolution involves evaluating the respective rights in a given 
conflict, and imposing an ordered settlement with one right as 
paramount. This method is upheld as an objective process leading 
to inherent truths. In reality, traditional legal approaches are 
steeped in subjective and normative selections. The decision-maker 
infuses the analysis with the values and priorities of a limited seg-
ment of the community. 
The consequence of this approach has been the entrenchment of 
legal principles which reflect traditionally male perspectives. For 
example, the legal approach of characterizing conflicts in terms of 
competing rights finds its philosophical underpinning in male ap-
proaches to reasoning. This focus on competing rights in defining 
and resolving conflict serves to overlook other perspectives, and ig-
nores the realities of individuals actually before the decision-
maker. 
In an attempt to address both the individual and collective ex-
perience, feminist legal theorists have moved beyond the constraints 
inherent in liberal legalism. Feminists have critiqued the rights-
based approach as one which neglects to address the realities of 
women. Insisting on the importance of process, Kathleen Bartlett 
espouses the necessity for a feminist methodology: 
t B.A. (Toronto), LL. B. (Dalhousie) anticipated 1994. 
1 K. O'Donovan, Sexual Divisions in Law (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 
1985) at 59. 
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Feminists cannot ignore method, because if they seek to 
challenge existing structures of power with the same 
methods that have defined what counts within those 
structures, they may instead "recreate the illegitimate 
power structures [that they are] trying to identify and 
undermine. "2 
In reaction to the valued certainty, predictability and rigidity of 
traditional legal rules, feminist legal methods emphasize 
flexibility and the capacity to recognize and respond to excluded 
viewpoints. Rather than ordering rights into an arbitrary hierarchy, 
feminist methodologies focus on the contextual realities of those 
most affected in order to reach a result which respects this context. 
The difficulties in employing a rights-based approach are evi-
denced in the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Re Eve,3 
which concerned the question of contraceptive sterilization of men-
tally incompetent women.4 The Court based its decision on the 
parens patriae jurisdiction. Writing for the unanimous Court, 
Laforest, J. restricted the exercise of that jurisdiction to exclude 
the contraceptive sterilization of the mentally incapacitated woman 
before it. This decision has been hailed by many as a victory for the 
mentally disabled. These accolades, however, are short-sighted. 
As the Court acknowledged in its analysis of the historical de-
velopment of this doctrine, parens patriae directs the court to focus 
on the well-being of the particular individual before it. The Court 
in Re Eve recognized that the scope of the best interests doctrine is 
unlimited. They chose, however, to limit it to the authorization of 
necessary surgical procedures for the mental and physical health of 
the person on behalf of whom the jurisdiction is exercised.5 This 
limitation is inappropriate with respect to with a doctrine that not 
only allows, but demands, a contextual approach. 
The Re Eve decision must be viewed in light of past abuses of 
court-ordered sterilization. In the recent past, eugenic sterilization 
2 K. Bartlett, "Feminist Legal Methods" (1990) 103 Harv. L. Rev. 829 at 830 
citing J. W. Singer, "Should Lawyers Care About Philosophy?" [1989] Duke L.J. 
1752. 
3 Re Eve(l986), 31 D.L.R (4th) 1. 
4 While arguably, this law applies to both men and women, the cases indicate a 
far greater incidence of women before the courts on this issue. As such, a 
contextual approach suggests that this is indeed a women's issue, and I will 
address it as such. 
5 Supra note 3 at 28-29. 
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of mentally disabled persons was widely practised in the United 
States,6 and two Canadian provinces had statutes providing for the 
sterilization of mentally "defective" people.7 One might argue that 
the Court sought to correct past violations by erecting steep barriers 
to sterilization. The unfortunate effect was to shift the focus away 
from Eve's personal situation, as is mandated by the parens patriae 
jurisdiction, to a more abstracted analysis centred on an evaluation 
of conflicting rights. 
The Court would have reached a different result if it had truly 
evaluated Eve's interest in reproductive autonomy, rather than as-
sessing such freedom in isolation. Then, in comparing Eve's interest 
in procreation with her interest in sexual autonomy, a more contex-
tual decision addressing the unique situation of this woman would 
have been reached. As Professor Elizabeth Scott notes: 
As a result of the trend toward de-institutionalization, a 
growing number of mentally disabled individuals live 
with their parents. Because current law reacts primarily to 
the state's historical wrongful treatment of institutional-
ized persons, it is not sufficiently responsive to the needs 
of retarded individuals who live with their families. 8 
Implicit in the approach employed by the Court was the assump-
tion of the primacy of the right to reproduce. The likely effect of 
this decision, namely, the denial of Eve's social development and 
sexual expression, seems not to have been considered. 
The focus on past abuses resulted in the Court upholding the 
presumption of the right to reproduce as fundamental. By extension, 
this freedom is beyond regulation by non-therapeutic sterilization, 
unless clear and meaningful consent can be given. Justifying the 
Court's position, Laforest, J. noted that medical science might one 
6 See the landmark case of Buck v. Bell (1927), 274 U.S.R. 200 at 207, where a 
majority of the U.S. Supreme Court sanctioned the sterilization of Carrie Buck, 
the mildly "retarded" daughter of a similarly afflicted woman, after having 
given birth to a "retarded" child. Holmes, J. stated: "three generations of 
imbeciles are enough." This decision is considered the high-water mark of 
eugenic theory. See also R. L. Burgdorf & M. P. Burgdorf, "The Wicked Witch is 
Almost Dead: Buck v. Bell and the Sterilization of Handicapped Persons" (1977) 
50 Temp. L.Q. 995. 
7 The Sexual Sterilization Act, R.S.A. 1970, c. 341, as rep. by 1972, c. 87; Sexual 
Sterilization Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 353, as rep. by 1973, c. 79. 
8 E. Scott, "Sterilization of Mentally Retarded Persons: Reproductive Rights 
and Family Privacy" [1986] Duke L.J. 806 at 808. 
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day provide for a correction of Eve's mental incapacity. At that 
point, he suggested, she would likely choose to exercise her repro-
ductive autonomy, thereby justifying its preservation. 
This rationale is doubly problematic. While there appears to 
have been no evidence before the Court indicating Eve's likelihood 
of eventual mental recovery, this possibility was given heavy consid-
eration in denying her sterilization. Also, the implication that Eve, 
if "competent," would choose to exercise her right to procreate 
echoes the claim of some critics, theorizing that the "maternal 
instinct" is one which has been artificially constructed to fulfil the 
societal norms of reproduction.9 The glorification of motherhood, 
these critics argue, may be largely a patriarchal attempt to control a 
function which is biologically beyond the control of men. The ef-
fect of a rights-based approach is to uphold certain values without 
addressing their differential impact on men and women. In this 
case, the value given to the freedom to reproduce is emphasized at 
the expense of sexual autonomy. 
By creating the dichotomy between Eve's right to sexual free-
dom and her freedom to procreate, the Court was forced to com-
pare conflicting entitlements and to make a normative choice as to 
which is of primary importance. The traditional approach attempts 
to objectifj this necessarily subjective selection, suggesting the ulti-
mate result as the only logical conclusion based on the facts and 
principles at bar. A closer look at this decision exposes extreme, 
hidden subjectivity in the reasoning. As Anne Bolton identifies: "a 
woman's right to procreate, (whether she wants children or not), is 
worth more than her right to experience her sexuality without the 
threat of pregnancy." 10 When faced with the choice between "let's 
sterilize them all" and "let's not sterilize any of them," the latter 
would be preferable. 11 
The exclusion of Eve's context from the Court's analysis is per-
haps the single most problematic aspect of this case. If the process 
had allowed for a more meaningful consideration of the individual 
who was before the court, such artificial polarization would have 
9 See S. Macintyre, "Who Wants Babies? The Social Construction of Instincts" 
in D. L. Barker & S. Allen, eds., Sexual Divisions and Society: Process and Change 
(London: Tavistock, 1976) at 150. 
lO A. Bolton, "Whatever Happened to Eve? A Comment" (1987) 17 Man. L.J. 
219 at 226. 
11 Ibid. 
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been avoided. Had the Court been willing to explore the benefits 
and detriments of both sterilization and its alternatives contextu-
ally, they would have recognized sterilization as the least restrictive 
alternative for Eve. 
In his judgment of this case, Campbell, J. of the P.E.I. Court of 
Appeal employed a contextual approach, concluding that "without 
the protection of a permanent sterilization the protected environ-
ment will become a guarded environment and the loss to 'Eve' in 
terms of her social options and her relative freedom would cause 
substantial injury ... "[emphasis added]. 12 The Supreme Court did 
not take effective notice of the fact that increasingly, more disabled 
people are de-institutionalized, living either with parents or in 
community group homes where there is potential for restrictions on 
sexual expression and freedom. 
Before the Court, there was substantial evidence of the concerns 
of Eve's mother that Eve would become pregnant unintentionally. 
While there was no explicit indication of the effects of this judg-
ment on Eve's life, the logical inference is that her freedom and per-
sonal autonomy would be curtailed. Arguably, the very freedoms 
which were more important to Eve were sacrificed in order to up-
hold a right that was less valuable to her. 
The way in which the Court considered the perspective of Eve's 
mother exemplifies the inadequacies of an abstract system of deci-
sion-making. LaForest, J. went to some lengths to explain that an 
exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction is strictly limited to the 
interests of the individual requiring its exercise. 13 The concerns of 
Eve's mother regarding the care she could give to an unplanned 
grandchild were irrelevant. He stated: 
One may sympathize with Mrs. E .... [b]ut the parens 
patriae jurisdiction cannot be used for her benefit. Its ex-
ercise is confined to doing what is necessary for the ben -
efit and protection of persons under disability like Eve. 
And a court, as I previously mentioned, must exercise 
12 Re Eve (1980), 74 A.P.R. 97 (P.E.I.C.A.) at 142. Compare this to the finding 
of Mr. Justice La Forest, supra note 3 at 30, that "[i]n the present case there is no 
evidence to indicate that a failure to perform the operation would have any 
detrimental effect on Eve's physical or mental health." 
13 Supra note 3 at 29. 
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great caution to avoid being misled by this all too human 
mixture of emotions and motives. 14 
In fact, a consideration of the "human mixture" is the only way a 
meaningful decision could have been reached. It is through a con-
sideration of the mother-daughter relationship that the "best inter-
ests" of Eve would have been properly assessed. Instead, the Court 
assumed a conflict between the interests of Eve and those of her 
mother. Assuming the focus of Mrs. E. to be upon her own best in-
terests, rather than those of her daughter, the Court worked from the 
premise that an evaluation of Eve's best interests must necessarily 
exclude the viewpoint of her mother. By removing a large factor of 
Eve's personal context from consideration, the Court failed in its 
obligations under the doctrine of parens patriae. By unnecessarily 
restricting this doctrine, "its individualized focus is lost and its 
beneficial thrust is overridden."15 Notably, the concluding portions 
of this judgment are markedly detached, with no direct reference to 
Eve. 
A contextual approach would have extended beyond the blind 
protection of the right to procreate, to consider the realities of 
Eve's circumstances. For feminist theorists, the legal method of 
"practical reasoning" 16 provides an approach to conflict resolution 
based on the particulars of a given situation rather than the 
application of predetermined rules and norms. Instead of treating 
problems as unique conflicts having only one solution, feminist 
practical reasoning mandates a consideration of the various 
divergent perspectives and calls for solutions based on the 
contextual integration of these viewpoints. In more traditional 
models of legal reasoning, the particular, unique details of a given 
problem are often ignored, as judges apply fixed legal rules which 
presuppose polarity of conflicts. With a practical reasoning 
approach, particular details and new facts "present opportunities for 
improved understandings and 'integrations'." 17 
Using this method, the more facts the decision-maker is ex-
posed to, the more informed and balanced the decision will be. In 
this way, feminist methodology has sought to reject abstract univer-
14 Ibid. at 31. 
l 5 P. Peppin, "Justice and Care: Mental Disability and Sterilization 
Decisions" [1989] Can. H.R.Y.B. 65 at 74. 
l6 Bartlett, supra note 2 at 850. 
17 Ibid. at 851. 
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sality in favour of concrete universality, which recognizes difference as 
the norm rather than the exception. 18 A broader approach to rea-
soning from context is capable of including this difference rather 
than ignoring it as irrelevant to the objective rule. 
In The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir refers to asking "the 
woman question." 19 While deceptively simple, this approach is 
central to any feminist analysis of the law. Asking the woman ques-
tion identifies "the gender implications of rules and practices which 
might otherwise appear neutral or objective."20 By examining the 
law's failure to consider the experiences of women, the first step 
toward changing the system is taken through recognizing insidious 
biases. Asking the woman question begins the process of decon-
structing tenets of the judicial system, such as the rights-based 
analysis, and replacing them with inclusionary alternatives which re-
spect an infinite variety of realities. 21 
In applying the woman question to Re Eve, one must ask whether 
or not this decision is a step forward for the position of women in 
society. This requires a consideration of not only Eve and women 
like her, but also their mothers and those women upon whom the 
burden of raising their children would fall. Former Madame Justice 
Bertha Wilson, a member of the Court in Re Eve, has since 
reconsidered the relevance of these questions. In a recent article on 
the doctrine of privacy, she wrote: 
While I would not wish to be thought to have changed my 
position on the correctness of our difficult decision in Re 
Eve, the finding that the interests of care-givers are to be 
disregarded obviously has problematic consequences for 
women. Since it is primarily women who carry the 
burden in our society of child rearing, it would likely be 
18 C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1982). While her definition of the existence of two separate models of rea-
soning has been widely accepted, her linking of these differences to gender has 
been criticized. See A. C. Scales, "The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An 
Essay" (1986) 95 Yale L.J. 1373 at 1382-1384. 
19 S. de Beauvoir, The Second Sex (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976) at xxvi. 
20 Bartlett, supra note 2 at 837. 
21 Heather Wishik poses a series of questions which could assist, at this stage in 
the inquiry, in recognizing how traditional legal concepts are subtle in their 
disadvantage to women. See H. R. Wishik, "To Question Everything: The 
Inquiries of Feminist Jurisprudence" (1985) 1 Berk. Worn. L.J. 64 at 72-77. 
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a woman and not a man who would be responsible for 
rearing the child of a woman such as Eve. 22 
Asking the woman question demonstrates that this decision is 
likely to have a disadvantageous impact on a least some women; 
namely, those who are mentally incapable of consenting to a con-
traceptive sterilization, and those women who are responsible for 
their care. As it stands, this decision precludes mentally 
"incompetent" women from legally obtaining a contraceptive 
sterilization, either through the consent of their guardian or by 
judicial exercise of parens patriae. In a position that has attracted 
substantial criticism for its extremism,23 the Court held that 
sterilization "should never be authorized for non-therapeutic 
purposes under the parens patriae jurisdiction" [emphasis added).24 
The intrusive impact of this decision falls disproportionately upon 
women as a community. It is not a decision which limits the 
freedoms and opportunities of men. Mentally "incompetent" 
women do not have the same opportunities for freedom and 
development as do "competent" women. Upholding motherhood 
and the right to procreate does not recognize the realities of 
mentally disabled women. Either this right is meaningless in a 
situation similar to Eve's, or its enforcement is harmful in 
restricting their opportunities for autonomy in an increasingly de-
institutionalized system. Since Eve would likely be unable to care 
adequately for a child, one must also consider the impact of such a 
decision on those upon whom the responsibility would fall. 
The Court's characterization of contraceptive sterilization as 
non-therapeutic precludes mentally disabled women from access to 
a procedure that other women have available to them. Protecting 
Eve from a pregnancy and birth which could be threatening to her 
should have been characterized as therapeutic. In the House of Lords 
decision in Re B, Lord Oliver expressed his disagreement with the 
Re Eve decision: 
If in that conclusion the expression "non-therapeutic" was 
intended to exclude measures taken for the necessary 
protection from future harm of the person over whom the 
22 B. Wilson, "Women, the Family, and the Constitutional Protection of 
Privacy" (1992) 17 Queen's L.J. 5 at 18. See also Peppin, supra note 15 at 80. 
23 See especially Re B, [1987] 2 All E.R. 206 (H.L.) at 213, 214 and 219 where 
Lords Hailsham, Bridge, and Oliver all indicate their opposition to this claim. 
24 Supra note 3 at 32. 
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jurisdiction is exercisable, then I respectfully dissent 
from it for it seems to be [sic] me to contradict what is 
the sole and paramount criterion for the exercise of the 
jurisdiction. 25 
By asking the woman question, the implications of the abstract, non-
contextual reasoning of this decision crystallize. 
The woman question also identifies a variety of views and con-
cerns from the community of women, many of which may diverge. 
The process of consciousness-raising, a basis of feminist method, 
serves to encourage the expression of these varied perspectives as a 
necessary step in determining the best solution.26 Through the 
process of articulating and "telling" one's experiences and compar-
ing them with the experiences of others, the effect of showing indi-
vidual encounters to mirror collective encounters is achieved. 27 This 
is yet another step in the process of reaching a solution to conflict 
which is both equitable and reflective of contextual realities. By 
fully exploring the various issues and perspectives surrounding any 
given legal dilemma in this way, the traditional position as es-
poused by the Supreme Court of Canada in this instance may be 
challenged. 
Within the context of Re Eve and the "sterilization dilemma," 
the rights-based analysis so central to our traditional legal method 
of decision-making shows inherent inadequacy and limitation. In a 
system which reapplies past values and norms through the doctrine 
of precedence, the opportunity to sensitize the courts to new reali-
ties is rare at best. By critiquing the way in which a focus on rights 
and rules does not reflect the experience and needs of women like 
Eve, and by employing alternative methodological models, move-
ment toward a more representative system begins. 
Elsewhere, Canadian courts have shown the capacity to ac-
knowledge the experience of battered women as requiring a broader 
25 Supra note 23 at 219. 
26 See C. MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism, Method, and State: An Agenda for 
Theory" (1982) 7 Signs 515 at 519. See also Scales, supra note 18 at 1401-1402; 
Bartlett, supra note 2 at 863-866. 
27 See: L. Bender, "A Lawyer's Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort" (1988) 38 
J. Leg. Educ. 3 at 9: "Feminist consciousness-raising creates knowledge by ex-
ploring common experiences and patterns that emerge from shared tellings of 
life events. What were experienced as personal hurts individually suffered reveal 
themselves as a collective experience of oppression." 
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interpretation of self-defence.28 Similarly, the reality of incest vic-
tims has been recognized through the court's extension oflimitation 
of actions legislation in the civil context.29 Ripe for reform is the 
issue of access to contraceptive sterilization for mentally disabled 
women. The doctrine of parens patriae mandates courts to 
emphasize the subjective reality of these women and to assist them 
in maximizing their opportunities for personal growth and devel-
opment rather than forcing them to sacrifice these opportunities in 
the name of an abstracted right to procreate. 
28 See R v. Lavallee, [1990] 4 W.W.R. 1 (S.C.C.). 
29 M(K)v. M(H), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 3. 
